St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 49

Number 3

Article 4

6-2018

A Status Update for Texas Voir Dire: Advocating for Pre-Trial
Internet Investigation of Prospective Jurors
Luke A. Harle
St. Mary's University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Judges
Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, Legal
Profession Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Luke A. Harle, A Status Update for Texas Voir Dire: Advocating for Pre-Trial Internet Investigation of
Prospective Jurors, 49 ST. MARY'S L.J. 665 (2018).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Harle: Pre-Trial Internet Investigation of Prospective Jurors

COMMENT
A STATUS UPDATE FOR TEXAS VOIR DIRE:
ADVOCATING FOR PRE-TRIAL INTERNET
INVESTIGATION OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS
LUKE ALAN HARLE*
I.
II.

III.

IV.

V.
VI.

Introduction ............................................................................................666
Background of Texas Law ....................................................................669
A. Texas Jury Qualifications ...............................................................669
B. The Purpose and Scope of Texas Voir Dire...............................671
C. Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct....................675
D. Texas Voir Dire Laws as Applied to Internet Research ...........676
Non-Texas Perspectives Regarding Internet Research of Jurors ...678
A. Judicial Attitudes of Federal District Courts ..............................679
B. Judicial Attitudes of State Courts .................................................681
C. Ethics Opinions from Outside of Texas .....................................685
Recognizing and Responding to Concerns ........................................689
A. Emboldening Jurors to Research .................................................689
B. Selecting a Biased Jury....................................................................691
C. Personal Appeals .............................................................................691
D. Infringing Juror Privacy .................................................................692
Updating Texas Voir Dire ....................................................................694
Conclusion ..............................................................................................697

*
The author would like to extend his thanks to his wife, Paige, for her consistent
encouragement and love, particularly through this endeavor; to his parents, Mark and Reneé, for their
unyielding support and inspiration; to Professor L. Wayne Scott for his advice and mentorship in
writing this Comment; and to Volume 49 of the St. Mary’s Law Journal, particularly Kathryn Kluge,
for their commitment to editorial excellence.

665

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 3, Art. 4

666

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:665

I. INTRODUCTION
“Don’t judge of men’s wealth or piety, by their Sunday appearances.”1
In the age of the Internet, trial attorneys no longer have to be prisoners
to appearances when evaluating prospective jurors. Any attorney with a
laptop and Wi-Fi has an ocean of data, and with a few clicks of a mouse,
can discover the person behind the jury number. People may reveal their
personality on the Internet more candidly than they do in the “realworld.”2 As a result, searching online is likely the most efficient way to
learn about the quirks, strengths, and flaws of a person.3 By simply
perusing a Facebook profile, attorneys can discover everything from one’s
political sensibilities to their nightlife tendencies. Armed with this
information, attorneys could design made-to-order cases, including
1. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANACK 137 (The Century Co. 1898) (1751).
2. Some behavioral scientists view the world as now existing on two separate planes—one
composed of atoms, the other composed of zeroes and ones. See Lisa Nakamura, Cyberrace,
123 PUBLICATION MOD. LANGUAGE ASS’N AM. 1673, 1676 (2008) (viewing the Internet as a
“second life” that allows users to connect and separate simultaneously); Amber Case, We Are All
Cyborgs Now, TED (Dec. 2010), https://www.ted.com/talks/amber_case_we_are_all_cyborgs_
now?language=en [https://perma.cc/M2NY-6PKR] (analogizing human interactions within the
digital world as an entirely secondary existence). Internet users may think of the online world as a
sanctuary where they can present their true personality. See Katrina Fong & Raymond A. Mar, What
Does My Avatar Say About Me? Inferring Personality from Avatars, 41 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 237, 238 (2015) (considering the Internet as a refuge for users to express their true
personalities); Mitja D. Back et al., Facebook Profiles Reflect Actual Personality, Not Self-Idealization,
21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 372, 372–73 (2010) (concluding, after empirical study, that Facebook profiles
accurately reflect the personality of its users); Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, How
Different Are Your Online and Offline Personalities?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2015, 5:38 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/media-network/2015/sep/24/online-offline-personality-digitalidentity [https://perma.cc/6E9F-PWJL] (“Although our digital identity may be fragmented, it seems
clear that our various online personas are all digital breadcrumbs of the same persona . . . .”). But see
Nathan Jurgenson, When Atoms Meet Bits: Social Media, the Mobile Web and Augmented Revolution,
4 FUTURE INTERNET 83, 84–86 (2012) (contending the duality of personalities in the real and virtual
world does not exist, opting for an enhanced reality instead—one in which the virtual world serves as
an extension of the real world). See generally SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN 10 (1995)
(portraying humans as dwelling “on the threshold between the real and virtual” and anticipating
“fundamental shifts” in the way humans create identity).
3. Where resumes, applications, and interviews were previously sufficient when making hiring
decisions, it is now often necessary to review the online social networks of prospective employees.
See Yuki Noguchi, Can’t Ask That? Some Job Interviewers Go to Social Media Instead, NPR (Apr. 11, 2014,
4:06 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/04/11/301791749/cant-ask-thatsome-job-interviewers-go-to-social-media-instead [https://perma.cc/YV69-K8AL] (reporting the
frequency at which employers review a prospective hire’s online social network to gather information
otherwise unobtainable in an interview).
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sections perfectly crafted to appeal to the specific interests of each juror.4
While using private juror information to those extents may toe the line
between resourceful and exploitative, the potential for online information
to reveal biases, relationships, or misconduct is unquestionably valuable.5
A quick Google search of a venireperson could give the court information
that, if undiscovered, might be grounds for a mistrial or new trial.6
Despite these advantages, lawyers have proceeded with caution,7
although bar associations have slowly began to permit passive review of a
juror’s public Internet presence.8 Reasonable concerns over invasions of
privacy, jury intimidation, and potential chilling effects on jury service have
led one court to condemn Internet research of the venire during voir dire.9
Texas courts, however, have not yet issued any opinion on the specific

4. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
(recognizing the potential for tailor-made jury panels by saying, “The jury is not a fantasy team”).
5. See Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 559 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam)
(suggesting parties to a case must actively brief themselves on the selected jurors backgrounds on
Case.net to shed any light on questionable findings, preserving the trial’s integrity); see also John G.
Browning, Voir Dire Becomes Voir Google: Ethical Concerns of 21st Century Jury Selection, BRIEF, Winter
2016, at 41, 42–43 [hereinafter Browning, Ethical Concerns] (outlining dangers of not researching
jurors through the Internet); Eric P. Robinson, Virtual Voir Dire: The Law and Ethics of Investigating
Jurors Online, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 597, 636–37 (2013) (posing the question of whether failure to
conduct online research of the venire is malpractice).
6. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 327 (providing for a new trial in instances of jury misconduct); Khoury
v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 189, 192–93 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming a lower court’s
decision to replace a juror with an active bias in the case, demonstrated through information found
by counsel on his Facebook profile); State v. Dellinger, 696 S.E.2d 38, 40–43 (W. Va. 2010) (per
curiam) (remanding a case for a new trial where one juror’s “lack of candor during voir dire regarding”
a pre-existing relationship with the defendant was later revealed upon discovering the two were
MySpace “friends”); see also Kathryn Kinnison Van Namen, Comment, Facebook Facts and Twitter
Tips—Prosecutors and Social Media: An Analysis of the Implications Associated with the Use of Social Media in the
Prosecution Function, 81 MISS. L.J. 549, 556–57 (2012) (reciting the highly publicized Casey Anthony
murder trial in which a juror was struck due to comments posted online saying, “Cops in Florida are
idiots and completely useless”). But see Shaw v. State, 139 So. 3d 79, 88–89 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (en
banc) (approving a trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial where a juror “made a comment on his
Facebook page regarding his jury duty, stating: ‘I guess all I need to know is GUILTY. lol’”).
7. See Sluss v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 215, 227 (Ky. 2012) (discussing the practice of
investigating prospective jurors on social media, while suspecting “a reasonable attorney without
guidance may not think this investigatory tactic appropriate”).
8. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466, at 4 (2014)
[hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 466] (emphasizing the right to privacy, allowing the inspection of a
juror’s visible online information, but denying any “access request” to be made).
9. See Oracle, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1104 (requiring attorneys to provide the court with an exact
record of every online search and all the information viewed).
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issue.10 The legislative and executive branches of Texas, at this time, also
remain silent on the question.11
The goal of this Comment is to use existing Texas law and ethics
guidelines to advocate for a policy that will allow attorneys to conduct
reasonable online research of public, self-published prospective juror
information during voir dire. This Comment aspires to be equally
persuasive in both civil and criminal contexts. Although there are
differences between the two, they are guided by similar principles.12
Part II of this Comment will present a brief background of existing
Texas law likely to shape future development of rules regarding Internet
researching of jurors during voir dire—namely, juror qualifications,
existing laws guiding voir dire, and the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct. Part III will review non-Texas perspectives,
10. While many Texas courts have issued several opinions regarding the scope of voir dire,
none have yet addressed the issue of Internet research of prospective jurors by attorneys. See, e.g.,
Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Tex. 2006) (wanting for direction from the
Texas Supreme Court on how lawyers should use the Internet during voir dire). Furthermore, the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, promulgated by the Supreme of Court of Texas, do not specifically
address the issue. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 226a (prohibiting the jury from posting about the case online,
but not prohibiting attorneys to investigate jurors); id. R. 228 (permitting “other evidence . . . for or
against” a challenge for cause made to a prospective juror to be heard during examination, though
not addressing the scope of permissible “other evidence” or whether it encompasses Internet
research during voir dire). Similarly, the Texas Committee on Professional Ethics, appointed
by the Supreme Court of Texas, has yet to rule on this specific issue.
See
generally Opinions, TEX. COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, https://www.legalethicstexas.com/EthicsResources/Opinions.aspx [https://perma.cc/TM6X-C8C5] (lacking a conclusive answer as to the
permissibility of researching a jury member during the trial process).
11. See generally TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 21.001–158.003 (West Supp. 2017) (lacking
direction on how lawyers should use the Internet during voir dire); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN.
(failing to condone or condemn the use of the Internet to research jurors during voir dire); see also
Index to Opinions, ATT’Y GEN. TEX., https://texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinion/index-to-opinions
[https://perma.cc/H7CX-PY8J] (listing all opinions of the Attorney General of Texas, none of
which address Internet research of prospective jurors during voir dire).
12. Civil and criminal cases in Texas are both guided by principles of broad latitude in
questioning prospective jurors, subject to the trial judge’s reasonable restrictions. See Babcock v. Nw.
Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. 1989) (recognizing the importance of granting a wide
margin for online juror-research to properly “discover any bias or prejudice” during the voir dire
process); Whitaker v. State, 653 S.W.2d 781, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (finding a judge’s discretion
over jury selection to be limited by the attorney’s right to procure an impartial jury). However,
criminal cases must consider constitutional rights to effective counsel, as well as additional
requirements for capital proceedings, for which there is no civil equivalent. See CRIM. PRO.
arts. 1.051(a), 37.071 (West Supp. 2017) (addressing the right to representation by counsel and the
procedure followed in capital cases). Both criminal and civil rules provide grounds for juror
disqualification. See GOV’T § 62.105 (West 2013) (establishing circumstances that disqualify an
individual from serving as a juror).
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including judicial and ethics opinions, concerning pre-trial Internet
investigation of prospective jurors. Part IV will recognize the issues
created by such Internet investigations and respond to those concerns.
Part V will use both Texas law and other opinions to suggest specific ways
Texas may update its voir dire structure, hopefully in a way that is
beneficial to attorneys while limiting unnecessary probing of jurors’
personal lives.
II. BACKGROUND OF TEXAS LAW
A. Texas Jury Qualifications
Texas, like other state and federal courts, requires jurors to meet
minimum qualifications.13 Texas also has a list of exemptions, which if
met, will allow a juror to be excused from service.14 Most information
regarding qualifications and exemptions is usually acquired through a
standard jury questionnaire.15 However, judges also maintain the ability to
test jury qualifications.16 Jurors who meet the minimum qualifications,
and who are not exempt or excused, will then proceed to the assigned
courtroom for the voir dire examination.17 Once in the courtroom, the
presiding judge administers an oath instructing the jurors to truthfully
answer all questions related to their qualifications to be a juror.18 The

13. See GOV’T § 62.102 (West Supp. 2017) (defining the qualifications for jurors in a Texas
civil case); CRIM. PRO. art. 35.19 (West 2006) (considering past conviction of a misdemeanor or
felony offense, a pending indictment for misdemeanor theft or felony, or insanity as absolute
disqualifications); see also 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/2 (2018) (requiring jurors to be
“[i]nhabitants of the county[,]” “[o]f the age of 18 years or upwards[,]” “of fair character,” and
“[c]itizens of the United States of America”); 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (2012) (listing the minimum
qualifications for jurors in federal court, including ability to read and speak English).
14. See GOV’T § 62.106 (providing a list of criteria that may exempt a potential juror from
service, including being over the age of 70, serving active duty in the military and deployed, and
having children under the age of 12).
15. See id. § 62.0132(c) (specifying the questions to be included on the basic jury
questionnaire).
16. See CRIM. PRO. arts. 35.10, 35.12 (granting the court the ability to test the qualifications of
the jurors if no challenges have been made by asking questions of the jurors’ past criminal history); see
also 8 WILLIAM V. DORSANEO III, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 120.01[4][a1] (2017) (explaining the
latitude given to judges in civil cases to determine whether one is “qualified for jury service”).
17. See 8 DORSANEO III, supra note 16, § 120.02[1] (detailing the preliminary procedures
before voir dire examination).
18. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 226 (“[T]he jurors shall be sworn by the court or under its direction, as
follows: ‘You, and each of you, do solemnly swear that you will true answers give to all questions
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court then reads instructions prescribed by the Texas Supreme Court that
preview the procedures of the trial and mandate certain behaviors of the
jury.19
Attorneys sculpt the initial venire into the final jury panel through
challenges for cause and peremptory challenges.20 Peremptory challenges
eliminate undesirable jurors from the jury without assigning any reason,21
while challenges for cause are objections made alleging the juror is unfit to
serve on the jury.22 Jurors are unfit for, and thus disqualified from, jury
service if they display any potential to judge a case on more than the
information being presented in court.23 Attorneys may learn of evidence
to support a challenge for cause based on responses to voir dire questions.

propounded to you concerning your qualifications as a juror, so help you God.’”); CRIM. PRO.
art. 35.02 (administering the same oath).
19. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 226a (instructing, among other things, that the jurors turn off their
electronic devices and “not communicate with anyone through any electronic device”).
20. See id. R. 227 (providing the availability of peremptory challenges and challenges for cause
in a civil setting); CRIM. PRO. arts. 35.14, 35.16 (announcing the availability of peremptory challenges
and challenges for cause in a criminal setting).
21. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 232 (“A peremptory challenge is made to a juror without assigning any
reason therefor.”); CRIM. PRO. art. 35.14 (describing how a peremptory challenge is asserted without
giving any reason for its making). In civil cases, a party is allowed six peremptory strikes in district
court and three in county courts. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 233 (allocating for six peremptory strikes, but
also allowing trial judges to “equalize” peremptory strikes in multiple party cases). The number of
peremptory strikes varies in criminal courts depending on the severity of the crime. See CRIM. PRO.
art. 35.15 (permitting fifteen peremptory strikes for capital cases and as few as three for
misdemeanors tried in county courts). While attorneys do not need to assign a reason for using a
peremptory strike, peremptory strikes are not to be used to stack the jury for the selection of a
favorable jury. See Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743, 750 (Tex. 2006) (“Peremptory
strikes are not intended, however, to permit a party to ‘select’ a favorable jury.”).
22. TEX. R. CIV. P. 228; CRIM. PRO. art. 35.16.
23. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.105 (West 2013) (disqualifying jurors who have an
interest “in the subject matter of the case[,]” who are biased or prejudiced in favor of one party, or
who have previously served in a trial “involving the same questions of fact”); CRIM. PRO. art. 35.16
(listing disqualifying characteristics of a juror in criminal contexts, including bias or prejudice towards
a party of the case). Lying, or failing to respond truthfully to an attorney’s questions during voir dire,
may be sufficient to set aside a judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 327(a) (maintaining an improper
response by a venire person on voir dire, if material, would be grounds for a new trial). The Texas
Supreme Court has found that “a juror’s failure to disclose information that establishes that the juror
is legally disqualified from serving on the jury is per se material.” In re Whataburger Rests. L.P.,
429 S.W.3d 597, 599 n.1 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (citing Burton v. R.E. Hable Co.,
852 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, no pet.)). However, a party moving for a new trial
based on juror misconduct during voir dire must also show the misconduct probably caused injury to
the movant. See id. at 598–600 (finding non-disclosure by jurors who were defendants in a prior case
to be material but probably not causing injury to the movant).
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However, attorneys may also rely on evidence beyond the given answer of
a juror to remove a juror with a challenge for cause.24
B. The Purpose and Scope of Texas Voir Dire
The purpose of voir dire is deceivingly simple: to empanel a fair and
impartial jury.25 To achieve this goal, attorneys may inquire about jurors’
specific experiences, perspectives, or relationships that would create a
predisposition favoring one party over the other.26 By asking the venire
personal questions, attorneys establish a basis for a challenge for cause and
facilitate the intelligent use of peremptory strikes.27 The difficulty arises
from strict tests from the United States and Texas Supreme Courts
24. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 228 (“Upon such challenge the examination is not confined to the
answers of the juror, but other evidence may be heard for or against the challenge.”); CRIM. PRO.
art. 35.18 (“Upon a challenge for cause, the examination is not confined to the answers of the juror,
but other evidence may be heard for or against the challenge.”). To win on an appeal for the failure
to exclude a disqualified juror, a party must inform the court that it exhausted its peremptory
challenges and thus lacked the ability to strike other objectionable jurors. See Hallet v. Hous. Nw.
Med. Ctr., 689 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex. 1985) (“It is at this point that any harmful error occurs, i.e.,
when the court is made aware that objectionable jurors will be chosen.”).
25. See In re Commitment of Hill, 334 S.W.3d 226, 228 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (proclaiming
that a jury must be, “to the greatest extent possible, [] free from bias”); Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d
707, 710–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (describing the function of voir dire as “further[ing] the
defendant’s constitutional right to . . . an ‘impartial’ jury” (citing Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727
(1992))); see also Richard J. Crawford & Daniel W. Patterson, Exploring and Expanding Voir Dire
Boundaries: A Note to Judges and Trial Lawyers, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 645, 646 (1997) (“[V]oir dire
exists for one straightforward and simple reason: to provide a screening step[,] . . . which will reduce
the possibility of disputes being resolved by citizens whose backgrounds, attitudes or predispositions
may interfere with a fair and impartial resolution of those disputes.”); Voir Dire, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining voir dire as “[a] preliminary examination of a prospective juror
by a judge or lawyer to decide whether the prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury”).
26. See Hyundai, 189 S.W.3d at 749 (encouraging lawyers to examine jurors for improper biases
that would substantially impair their ability to perform their duty according to the oath or
instructions). Prior to the voir dire examination, the court reads admonitory instructions prescribed
by the Texas Supreme Court that preview the procedures of the trial and mandate certain behaviors
of the jury. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 226a (instructing jurors to provide truthful answers if questioned by
attorneys about their backgrounds, experiences, and attitudes).
27. See Hill, 334 S.W.3d at 229 (finding attorneys have a right to question potential jurors to
discover biases and facilitate intelligent use of peremptory challenges); Sanchez, 165 S.W.3d at 710–11
(perceiving the first purpose of voir dire as eliciting information which would cause a potential juror
to be legally disqualified or establish a bias or prejudice of the juror that would create “a basis for a
challenge for cause” and the second purpose as “facilitat[ing] the intelligent use of peremptory
challenges”). Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment forbids peremptory challenges made solely based on the race of the
juror); Davis v. Fisk Elec. Co., 268 S.W.3d 508, 526 (Tex. 2008) (applying Batson and determining the
peremptory strikes were used according to the prospective jurors’ race).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 3, Art. 4

672

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:665

regarding what constitutes “impartiality”28 and “bias”29 combined with
the inherent biases all humans carry.30 Regardless of the difficulty, a jury
panel free from bias or prejudice is guaranteed by the federal31 and state32
constitutions, and is foundational to the Texas adversarial system of
justice.33

28. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (“[A] juror who has formed an opinion
cannot be impartial.” (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878))); Hayes v.
Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887) (establishing impartiality requires jurors to be free from bias towards
the defendant as well as without any prejudice against the prosecution).
29. In Compton v. Henrie, the Texas Supreme Court distinguished bias and prejudice.
364 S.W.2d 179, 181–82 (Tex. 1963). The court defined bias as “an inclination toward one side of an
issue rather than to the other[.]” Id. at 182. Prejudice, on the other hand, was defined simply as
“‘prejudgment,’ and consequently embraces bias[.]” Id. To be disqualified on the basis of bias, it
must be apparent that the juror “will not . . . act with impartiality.” Id. at 181–82.
30. Social sciences recognize implicit bias as the involuntary habit of a person to associate
certain groups of people with characteristics that do not align with reality. See Cheryl Staats et al.,
State of Science: Implicit Bias Review, KIRWAN INST., 2016, at 14 (describing the unconscious association
humans make between certain identity groups and certain characteristics). All people are susceptible
to implicit biases. See id. at 14–15 (defining “implicit bias” as “attitudes or stereotypes that affect our
understanding, actions, and decisions in an unconscious manner”); Félice van Nunspeet et al.,
Reducing Implicit Bias: How Moral Motivation Helps People Refrain from Making “Automatic” Prejudiced
Associations, 1 TRANSLATIONAL ISSUES IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 382, 382–83 (2015) (observing the
“widespread presence” of implicit biases and proposing a method to help combat it). The United
States Supreme Court has recognized the phenomenon. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty.
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2511–12 (2015) (commending the Fair
Housing Act’s role in permitting plaintiffs to defend against “unconscious prejudices”). Cf. Compton,
364 S.W.2d at 181–82 (“To a greater or lesser extent, bias and prejudice form a trait common in all
men; however, to fall within the disqualifying provision . . . certain degrees thereof must exist.”).
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed . . . .”); see also Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Att’y Gen. Colo., 205 U.S. 454, 462
(1907) (recognizing jury prejudice threatens the American system of trials in which decisions are to
be founded according to evidence and argument made in court).
32. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury.”); id. art. I, § 15 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”);
id. art. V, § 10 (“In the trial of all causes in the District Courts, the plaintiff or defendant
shall . . . have the right of trial by jury . . . .”).
33. The Texas Declaration of Independence listed Mexico’s failure to guarantee a trial by jury
as a grievance when Texas declared independence on March 2, 1836. See THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (Repub. Tex. 1836), reprinted in 1 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822–
1897, at 1063, 1065 (Gammel Book Co. 1898) (listing Mexico’s failure “to secure, on a firm basis, the
right of trial by jury”); see also R. Brent Cooper & Diana L. Faust, Procedural and Judicial Limitations on
Voir Dire—Constitutional Implications and Preservation of Error in Civil Cases, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 751, 760–
62 (2009) (providing a detailed history of Texas’ preservation of the right to trial by jury).
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Texas protects this right by affording attorneys—not judges—broad
latitude in questioning jurors during voir dire examinations.34 However,
the definition of “broad” is largely at the discretion of the trial judge.35
Judges must allow questions that seek to discover grounds for challenges
for cause or facilitate the intelligent use of peremptory challenges.36 Texas
has not promulgated guidance on the scope of general voir dire
questioning,37 although Texas courts have indicated “commitment
questions”—questions which attempt to preview the votes of jurors—are
improper.38 Judges additionally have discretion over the time in which
voir dire must be completed.39 However, appellate review to determine
whether a trial court abused its discretion in this regard is primarily

34. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a) (granting attorneys and the court power to examine
prospective jurors), with TEX. R. CIV. P. 226a (assigning attorneys in state courts the right to question
prospective jurors), In re Commitment of Hill, 334 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam)
(conferring a right on attorneys to question potential jurors to discover biases), and Babcock v. Nw.
Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. 1989) (supplying attorneys “broad latitude” during voir dire
to discover any juror bias or prejudice). But see TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. arts. 35.10, 35.12 (West
2006) (furnishing the court with the power to “try the qualifications of those” who appear for jury
duty); see also 8 DORSANEO III, supra note 16, § 120.01[4][a1] (pointing out the latitude judges enjoy in
determining a juror’s qualifications).
35. See Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743, 753 (Tex. 2006) (announcing judicial
discretion as a “primary rule” of voir dire and vesting trial judges with the authority to determine
whether voir dire questions probe into prejudices or potential verdicts). Cf. McCoy v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 793, 801–02 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (upholding a trial judge’s
determination, which limited voir dire to 30 minutes for each party).
36. See Babcock, 767 S.W.2d at 709 (holding judges’ decisions during voir dire examination to
an abuse of discretion standard).
37. See Hyundai, 189 S.W.3d at 750 (acknowledging the subjective nature of “voir dire does not
lend itself to formulaic management”); see also 8 DORSANEO III, supra note 16, § 120.02[1] (“The
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide virtually no guidance on the subject of the voir dire
examination of jury panels by counsel.”); William V. Dorsaneo III, The History of Texas Civil Procedure,
65 BAYLOR L. REV. 713, 822 n.702 (2013) (recognizing Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 230 as the only
rule guiding the conduct of voir dire).
38. See Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (“[A] question is a
commitment question if one or more of the possible answers is that the prospective juror would
resolve or refrain from resolving an issue in the case on the basis of one or more facts contained in
the question.”); see also Hyundai, 189 S.W.3d at 753 (concluding that questions asked to preview juror
votes are improper).
39. See Mathis v. State, 576 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“Inherent in the trial court’s discretion over the scope and course of voir dire is his ability to
(1) place reasonable time limits on the examination . . . .” (citing Abron v. State, 523 S.W.2d 405, 408
(Tex. Crim. App. 1975))); McCoy, 59 S.W.3d at 797 (announcing the court’s discretion over voir dire
proceedings and continuing with an analysis over whether a court abused its discretion in limiting
voir dire).
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concerned with voir dire being excessively limited rather than excessively
lengthy.40
Rather than precisely insisting on a pre-determined method, order, and
length of voir dire examination, Texas affords attorneys freedom to
conduct voir dire how they best see fit, subject to reasonable judicial
limitations.41 As such, attorneys practicing in Texas courts traditionally
have more opportunity to control the composition of the jury than their
federal court counterparts. However, despite the apparent amorphous
nature of Texas voir dire conventions, judge-made law provides some
semblance of structure, usually to prohibit questions crafted to improperly
influence jurors prior to trial.42 For example, counsel cannot bring
inadmissible information to the jury’s attention,43 attempt to create a bias
against a party,44 or comment on the personal lives of the parties or their
attorneys.45 Reasonable voir dire restrictions, such as these, protect juror
privacy and the sanctity of the trial while also allowing maximum room for
counsel to rid biases from the final jury panel.
40. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals developed a three-prong test to determine if a court
abused its discretion in imposing time limitations on voir dire. See Ratliff v. State, 690 S.W.2d 597,
599–600 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (reviewing the test the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals historically
applied to determine whether “the trial court abused its discretion in the time limitation which it
imposed” and applying a three-factor test). The three factors to be considered are: “(1) whether the
defendant’s voir dire examination reveals an attempt to prolong the voir dire;” (2) whether the
questions that were disallowed were proper questions; and (3) whether the party was not permitted to
individually examine prospective jurors who actually served on the jury. Id. The Ratliff factors were
first used in a civil proceeding in McCoy v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Cooper & Faust, supra note 33, at 776.
41. See 4 ROY W. MCDONALD & ELAINE A. GRAFTON CARLSON, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE
§ 21:19 (2d ed. 2001) (recognizing “[t]he importance of allowing reasonable latitude in the
questioning” during voir dire). Compare N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 202.33 (2016)
(prescribing, with detail, the methods to be used during voir dire examination), and CAL. STDS. JUD.
ADMIN. § 3.25 (2018) (providing lists of questions to ask prospective jurors in accordance with
different areas of the law), with TEX. R. CIV. P. 216–36 (lacking any rule prescribing how voir dire
should be conducted, with the exception of TEX. R. CIV. P. 230, which forbids any questions
regarding jurors’ prior criminal convictions), and TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 35.17 (West 2006)
(requiring voir dire to be conducted “in the presence of the entire [jury] panel”).
42. See 8 DORSANEO III, supra note 16, § 120.02[2A][b] (presenting a list of Texas cases in
which the court restricted voir dire examination that, when read together, create a theme of avoiding
premature influence of the jury). The Texas cases are addressed in further detail below.
43. See A.J. Miller Trucking Co. v. Wood, 474 S.W.2d 763, 766 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1971,
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (referencing the defendant’s liability insurance may be reversible error).
44. See, e.g., Tex. & N.O.R. Co. v. Lide, 117 S.W.2d 479, 480 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1938, no
writ) (finding questions to the jury regarding the wealth of the defendant highly improper).
45. See Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Reed, 659 S.W.2d 849, 855–56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (upholding the trial court’s decision to prohibit questions pertaining to
the jury’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s multiple former married names).
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C. Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
The intentionally vague rules guiding voir dire examinations in Texas
allow trial attorneys flexibility in securing an impartial jury; however, the
methods involved may go only as far as Rule 3.06 of the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct allow.46 The primary goal of
this rule is to protect jurors from all extraneous influences, including
influences resulting from attorney conduct.47 Thus, this rule prohibits
certain prejudicial contact between lawyers, jurors, and prospective
jurors.48
First, the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct prevent
attorneys from inflicting needless harm onto third persons while
representing their client.49 The rules proscribe any “vexatious or
harassing investigation of a venireman or juror[.]”50 The official
comments caution any attorney conducting an investigation of a juror to
do so with “circumspection and restraint.”51 Furthermore, attorneys, and
any other representative, are prohibited from communicating with a juror
or jurors’ family members during the course of trial.52 Unauthorized,
extrajudicial communication between a juror and a party, counsel, or
witness creates a rebuttable presumption of harm to the accused.53
In addition to preventing attorneys from improperly influencing
prospective jurors, Rule 3.06 requires counsel to report to the court any
venireman misconduct or misconduct by another toward a venireman.54

46. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 7, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN., tit 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2013) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9) (providing the
“minimum standards of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary
action”); see also id. R. 3.06 (outlining proper conduct for Texas attorneys and their relationships with
prospective jurors).
47. See id. R. 3.06 cmt. 1 (“To safeguard the impartiality that is essential to the judicial process,
veniremen and jurors should be protected against extraneous influences.”).
48. See id. (“There should be no extrajudicial communication with veniremen prior to trial or
with jurors during trial or on behalf of a lawyer connected with the case.”).
49. See id. R. 4.04 (mandating lawyers should always avoid embarrassing, delaying, or
burdening a third person).
50. Id. R. 3.06(a)(1).
51. Id. R. 3.06 cmt. 2.
52. See id. R. 3.06(e) (applying the restrictions to the family members of the veniremen or
jurors).
53. See Mayo v. State, 708 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (discussing a case in which
“the foreman of the jury[] made a telephone call to . . . a witness who testified on behalf of the
defense in the punishment phase” of a capital murder trial).
54. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.06(f).
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Attorneys are obligated to report this information to the court immediately
upon discovery.55 In Mize v. State,56 an appellate judge scolded a
prosecutor who had knowledge of harassing phone calls made to a juror,
yet failed to inform the court.57 Although the error was not found to be
reversible error,58 the judge still chided the attorney, saying he “usurp[ed]
the judicial function of the trial court” by “substitut[ing] his judgment for
that of the trial court[.]”59 This incident occurred during the punishment
phase of a trial rather than voir dire; however, the underlying principle
remains the same: lawyers should remain alert to discover extrajudicial
factors that might taint the impartiality of the final jury panel, and report
any such influences to the court as soon as feasible.60
D. Texas Voir Dire Laws as Applied to Internet Research
Texas law alone suggests that attorneys should have the latitude to use
the Internet to research prospective jurors during voir dire. Attorneys are
granted broad latitude to ask questions that will facilitate intelligent use of
peremptory challenges or discover grounds for challenges for cause,
subject to the trial court’s discretion. That same approach, were it
extended to the Internet, would further enable the court to empanel a fair
and impartial jury. Courts would still be able to use their discretion to
limit the depth of searches and the time available for Internet research.
Furthermore, should Texas affirmatively allow the use of the Internet to
research the venire during voir dire, Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct would continue to apply. Vexatious and harassing
investigations by an attorney to a prospective juror or a juror’s family

55. See id. (requiring lawyers who learn of improper jury conduct to “promptly” report such
conduct to the court).
56. Mize v. State, 754 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1988, pet. ref’d).
57. See id. at 737–38 (recounting the facts leading to the appeal).
58. See id. at 740 (“While no reversible error occurred in the present case, prosecutors are
strongly advised to conform their conduct to the Code of Professional Responsibility.”).
59. Id.
60. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.06 cmt. 4 (imploring that all
lawyers who learn of “any actions that threaten the integrity of the jury system” promptly report such
information to the court); see also Barbara Hanson Nellermoe & Fidel Rodriguez, Jr., Professional
Responsibility and the Litigator: A Comprehensive Guide to Texas Disciplinary Rules 3.01 Through 4.04, 28 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 443, 474 (1997) (concluding, after a review of Texas Disciplinary Rule 3.06, that attorneys
should not only behave in compliance with the rule, but should also remain observant “of what is
going on in the proceedings”).
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member would be prohibited as it is now.61 Additionally, and perhaps
more importantly, attorneys would still be prohibited from communicating
with jurors.62
Notably, however, Rule 3.06(c) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, which prohibits attorney communication with
prospective jurors, does not define communication.63 The manner in which
Texas courts choose to define and apply the word communication to Internet
research of jurors during voir dire will determine what is and is not a Rule
3.06 violation.64 The failure to provide a precise definition has left social
media interactions in a newfound gray-area within the common definition
of the word.65 But, whether an attorney communicates with a juror by
affirmatively “friending” them on Facebook or “following” them on
Twitter or Instagram may be deduced by a review of bar association ethics
opinions nationwide.66 Nevertheless, Texas certainly has not provided a
clear answer to this point.67 Similarly, the extent to which “passive
viewing”68 of jurors’ online information left available to the public
constitutes a Rule 3.06 violation is also unknown at this point in time.69
61. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.06(a)(1) (prohibiting vexatious or
harassing investigations of jurors or their family members).
62. See id. R. 3.06(c) (forbidding attorneys from communicating with jurors).
63. See id. (failing to provide a definition for communication).
64. See id. R. 3.06(a)(1) (“A lawyer shall not: (1) conduct or cause another . . . to conduct a
vexatious or harassing investigation of a venireman or juror . . . .”).
65. Compare Communication, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (“Information given;
the sharing of knowledge by one with another; conference; consultation or bargaining preparatory to
making a contract. Intercourse; connection.”), with Communication, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014) (defining communication as “[t]he interchange of messages or ideas by speech, writing,
gestures, or conduct; the process of bringing an idea to another’s perception”).
66. See, e.g., ABA Formal Op. 466, supra note 8, at 4 n.6 (providing a list of state bar
association ethics opinions, nearly all of which prohibit attorney’s from “friending” jurors).
67. Texas law has only gone as far as allowing attorneys to obtain a list of jury panel members
and restricting the applicability of jurors’ privacy protections to the final jury panel. Compare Tex.
Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0405 (2001) [hereinafter Tex. Op. JC-0405] (declining to extend the privacy
protections provided to the final jury panel to prospective jurors), with Tex. Att’y Gen. Op.
No. C-239 (1964) [hereinafter Tex. Op. C-239] (permitting both prosecution and defense counsel to
obtain a list of jury panel members at the judge’s discretion).
68. The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility defined passive
viewing of an online profile as a “review of a juror’s website or [electronic social media] that is
available without making an access request where the juror is unaware that a website or ESM has
been reviewed[.]” ABA Formal Op. 466, supra note 8, at 2.
69. Under existing Texas law, an attorney may ask a judge to provide a list of jury panel
members, and presumptively research them on the Internet, without violating the privacy protections
to the final jury panel. Compare Tex. Op. JC-0405, supra note 67 (allowing the provision of the jury
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III. NON-TEXAS PERSPECTIVES REGARDING INTERNET RESEARCH
OF JURORS
While Texas courts have been silent on the issue of whether attorneys
may use the Internet to evaluate the venire during voir dire, several federal
district courts have shared their views on the issue.70 State courts from
Missouri, New Jersey, and Kentucky have also written on the issue,
generally encouraging lawyers to use the Internet as a tool to evaluate
prospective jurors.71 Additionally, the American Bar Association, as well
as several state and local bar associations, have crafted ethics opinions that
recognize dangers that come hand-in-hand with increasing the presence of
the Internet in a courtroom.72 However, those opinions also acknowledge
the ubiquitous reality of the Internet in the twenty-first century, as well as
the potential benefits. The perspectives from these opinions will reveal
the strengths, and perhaps the deficiencies, of existing Texas law and guide
the development of a new rule.

panel’s personal information “to counsel for the purpose of voir dire”), with Tex. Op. C-239, supra
note 67 (“[I]f the judge wishes to follow the custom of making the jury panel list available prior to
the time of trial, he may do so.”).
70. See United States v. Norwood, No. 12-CR-20287, 2014 WL 1796644, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
May 6, 2014) (fearing monitoring the jurors’ Internet use would discourage jurors from wanting to
serve); Burden v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 08-cv-04-DRH, 2011 WL 3793664, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 24,
2011) (considering Internet research as part of an attorney’s reasonable diligence to investigate). See
generally Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (criticizing the
practice of using the Internet to gather information regarding jurors’ prior litigation history).
71. See Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 559 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam)
(charging an affirmative duty on attorneys to use a specific Internet resource to research jurors);
Khoury v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 189, 201–03 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (upholding a trial
court’s decision to remove a juror after Facebook investigation revealed posts protesting against
commercial foods); Carino v. Muenzen, No. L-0028-07, 2010 WL 3448071, at *10 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010) (per curiam) (reversing a trial judge who denied a lawyer’s ability to
research jurors over the Internet); Sluss v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 215, 227–28 (Ky. 2012)
(permitting pre-trial research of prospective jurors).
72. Compare ABA Formal Op. 466, supra note 8, at 4 (allowing an attorney to review jurors’
online presence but prohibiting an attorney’s attempt to access private portions of a
juror’s social media), and Or. State Bar, Formal Op. No. 2013-189, at 2 (2013),
http://www.osbar.org/_docs/ethics/2013-189.pdf [https://perma.cc/BNJ9-5QDB] [hereinafter Or.
Formal Op. 2013-189] (permitting review of public information, but forbidding lawyers to “friend”
jurors), with N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2012-2, at 1 (2012),
https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072303-FormalOpinion2012-02JuryResearchand
SocialMedia.pdf [http://perma.cc/UHK8-JFAF] [hereinafter N.Y.C. Formal Op. 2012-2] (approving
of attorney’s use of the Internet for juror research).
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A. Judicial Attitudes of Federal District Courts
In March 2016, Judge William H. Alsup of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California delivered the most stinging criticism of
the practice of researching and evaluating prospective jurors over the
Internet to date. The case, Oracle v. Google,73 was at that point nearly six
years in the making,74 and the attorneys for both sides requested the jurors
to complete a two-page questionnaire for the parties to review for multiple
days before voir dire began.75 Upon being asked, the attorneys admitted
the extra time was going to be spent “scrubbing” the Internet presence of
each juror.76
With this, Judge Alsup delivered an order outlining three potential fears
if either Oracle or Google were allowed to spend time using the Internet
to research jurors.77 First, he feared attorney research of jurors would set
a poor example for the jurors, and as a result, the jurors would be more
likely to conduct research of their own.78 Additionally, the judge worried
the information discovered from online social media websites would be
used for more than merely establishing challenges for cause or facilitating
use of peremptory strikes.79 Rather, if permitted to use the Internet to
research jurors, attorneys might exploit a juror’s personal preferences
during trial.80 Finally, Judge Alsup sought to protect the jurors’ privacy.81
The parties, in the judge’s opinion, were treating the jury panels like
“fantasy team[s],” rather than sacrificial, civically responsible citizens.82

73. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
74. See id. at 1102 (stating the case began in 2010).
75. See id. at 1101 (reciting the parties’ requests for extra time to review the juror
questionnaires).
76. See id. (recounting the judge’s discovery of the parties’ plans to research the jurors over the
Internet).
77. Id. at 1102–04.
78. See id. at 1102 (anticipating jurors would consider the judge’s “no-research” admonition
one-sided and would consequently use the Internet to research the parties and the case).
79. See id. at 1102–03 (fearing, if permitted to use the Internet, attorneys would exploit jurors’
personal preferences for books or movies by crafting arguments including allusions to those books or
movies).
80. See id. at 1103 (providing To Kill A Mockingbird as a potential favorite book of a juror, the
knowledge of which might be exploited by an attorney).
81. See id. (compelling the parties to respect the privacy of jurors).
82. See id. (defending juror privacy by proclaiming their sacrificial nature and willingness to
serve).
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Considering those fears, Judge Alsup contemplated imposing an
outright ban on Internet-usage to evaluate the venire.83 However, he
recognized doing so would result in attorneys lacking information
potentially obtainable by the media or general public.84 Therefore, rather
than banning all Internet research, Judge Alsup reluctantly allowed the
parties to use the Internet, subject to several conditions.85 Notable
amongst those conditions was a requirement that jurors must be informed
of the impending searches and be given an opportunity to adjust their
social media privacy settings.86 Furthermore, the litigating parties were
required to maintain “an exact record of every search and all information
viewed.”87 Finally, the order prohibited parties from using personal
appeals based on juror information discovered from online searches.88
No other federal court order or opinion has addressed the issue as
directly as Oracle v. Google. However, two other federal judges have
presented previews of how they might rule should the question come
before their court.
In 2014, Judge Mark A. Goldsmith of the Eastern District of Michigan
issued an order empaneling an anonymous jury89 for trial over the
83. See id. at 1103–05 (advocating for an “outright ban” on juror evaluation with the Internet,
but reluctantly allowing the parties to decide for themselves).
84. See id. at 1103 (“[W]ith an outright ban, everyone in the gallery could have more
information about the venire persons and the empaneled jurors than the lawyers themselves.”).
85. See id. at 1103–04 (listing the requirements parties must meet if they insist on using the
Internet to evaluate prospective jurors).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1104.
88. Id.
89. Where an anonymous jury is empaneled in a criminal case, identifying information of the
jurors—including names—may not be disclosed. See William D. Brenner, Annotation, Propriety of
Using Anonymous Juries in State Criminal Cases, 60 A.L.R.5th 39, 45 (1998) (introducing the concept of
anonymous juries). The rules surrounding the empaneling of an anonymous jury vary by jurisdiction.
See id. (“Jurisdictions have rules, regulations, constitutional provisions, or legislative enactments
directly bearing upon this subject.”). Some jurisdictions prohibit disclosure to just the public, while
others prohibit disclosure to the attorneys as well as the public. See id. (distinguishing between
varieties of anonymous juries for the purpose of the annotation). The decision generally rests upon
consideration of several factors, primarily involving risk of danger or harassment to the jurors. See,
e.g., United States v. Lawson, 535 F.3d 434, 439 (6th Cir. 2008) (listing three factors to be considered
before empaneling an anonymous jury). The Texas provision for anonymous juries is found in article
35.29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and prohibits disclosure to the parties, public, and media.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 35.29 (West Supp. 2017) (prohibiting disclosure of jurors’
personal information except by an application showing good cause). Significantly, however, the
Attorney General has specifically removed the anonymous jury provision from the purview of voir
dire. See Tex. Op. JC-0405, supra note 67 (confining the purpose and scope of article 35.29 to the
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defense’s request for juror identity information.90 The defense sought the
jurors’ information, among other reasons, to monitor their social media
use over the course of the trial.91 The court overruled the defense’s
motion, concluding that monitoring the jurors “would ‘unnecessarily chill
the willingness of jurors summoned from our community to serve as
participants in our democratic system of justice.’”92
To the contrary, former Chief Judge David Richard Herndon from the
Southern District of Illinois implicitly imposed an affirmative duty to use
the Internet to research jurors.93 When a defense attorney filed a motion
for new trial alleging juror dishonesty, the court considered those
objections untimely.94 In the judge’s opinion, the information about the
jurors was available through the Internet and should have been discovered
during voir dire.95 As opposed to finding Internet research a danger, the
judge considered it an element of an attorney’s reasonable diligence.96
B. Judicial Attitudes of State Courts
State court cases addressing the issue are scarce, but the majority tend to
permit research of jurors using the Internet during voir dire.97 Most
notably, in Johnson v. McCullough,98 the Supreme Court of Missouri
final jury panel rather than the venire, therefore, allowing personal information of the jurors to be
used by attorneys during voir dire).
90. United States v. Norwood, No. 12-CR-20287, 2014 WL 1796644, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
May 6, 2014).
91. See id. at *3–4 (reviewing defense’s requests for juror information to facilitate bias
discovery in voir dire and to monitor social media conduct).
92. Id. (quoting United States v. Kilpatrick, No. 10-20403, 2012 WL 3237147, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 7, 2012)).
93. See Burden v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 08-cv-04-DRH, 2011 WL 3793664, at *9 (S.D. Ill.
Aug. 24, 2011) (implying that diligent attorneys should use the Internet to research jurors and raise
objections during voir dire).
94. See id. (overruling defendant’s motion for new trial, in part, because the defendant’s
objections to the empaneling of specific jurors were considered waived when not raised during voir
dire).
95. Id.
96. See id. (deeming Internet research to be a necessary element of attorney’s reasonable
diligence in identifying a juror’s potential biases).
97. See John G. Browning, As Voir Dire Becomes Voir Google, Where Are the Ethical Lines Drawn?,
25 JURY EXPERT, May/June 2013, at 1, 1 (discussing “the revolution in communication that social
networking represents [which] has provided attorneys and trial consultants with a vast digital treasure
trove of information about prospective jurors” and how the Missouri Supreme Court, the New Jersey
Superior Court, and the Eastern District of Michigan Court has addressed the plethora of issues on
using the Internet during the voir dire process).
98. Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam).
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imposed an affirmative duty on attorneys to research jurors using
“Case.net,” a Missouri online database,99 to determine whether
prospective jurors had previously served as a juror.100 Despite only
addressing this narrow, state-specific database, the court hinted at the
increasing role of the Internet within voir dire in the future by declaring:
[I]n light of advances in technology allowing greater access to information
that can inform a trial court about the past litigation history of venire
members, it is appropriate to place a greater burden on the parties to bring
such matters to the court’s attention at an earlier stage. . . . [A] party must
use reasonable efforts to examine the litigation history on Case.net of those
jurors selected but not [empaneled] and present to the trial court any
relevant information prior to trial.101

The attitude of this opinion was later promulgated as Missouri Supreme
Court Rule 69.025, which requires an online pretrial review of a juror’s
litigation history and objection to a prospective juror, if at all, before the
jury is sworn.102
Not even four months after Johnson was decided, attorneys in Khoury v.
ConAgra Foods, Inc.,103 followed the instruction of the Missouri Supreme
Court and agreed to review prospective juror litigation history on Case.net
prior to voir dire examinations.104 The morning of trial, but before
opening statements, defense counsel, who was representing a
manufacturer of microwaved popcorn, informed the court that one
prospective juror had previously revealed a bias against corporate,
The trial court subsequently
commercial food manufacturers.105

99. Missouri describes Case.net as providing “access to the Missouri state courts automated
case management system,” where users can view “case records, including docket entries, parties,
judgments and charges in public court.” CASE.NET, https://www.courts.mo.gov/casenet/
base/welcome.do [https://perma.cc/CUV8-RLJH].
100. See Johnson, 306 S.W.3d at 558–59 (discussing advances in technology and access to
information that enable attorneys to inform the court about a juror’s prior litigation history at an
earlier stage in voir dire).
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 69.025(d) (2017) (“A party who has reasonable grounds to believe
that a prospective juror has failed to disclose that he or she has been a party to litigation must so
inform the court before the jury is sworn.”).
103. Khoury v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
104. Id. at 193.
105. See id. (stating the defense counsel considered the juror “a prolific poster for anticorporation, organic foods”).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss3/4

18

Harle: Pre-Trial Internet Investigation of Prospective Jurors

2018]

COMMENT

683

questioned the juror and sustained a motion to strike.106 The Missouri
Court of Appeals considered the removal of the juror within the discretion
of the trial court.107 Significantly, however, the court of appeals refused
to extend the timing restriction of Johnson and Rule 69.025 to Internet
research other than litigation history.108 By making such a delineation, the
court implicitly declared that Internet research of jurors, when done in a
manner unrelated to prior litigation history, is without restriction.109
In New Jersey, an appellate court held a trial court’s preclusion of
Internet research of jurors to be an abuse of discretion.110 The trial court
deemed the research an unfair advantage to the researching party, and
subsequently prohibited it, considering the other party was not given
advance notice.111 The appellate court recognized that—like Texas—trial
court judges are afforded broad discretion to control jury selection.112
Nevertheless, the appellate court found prohibiting online research an
unfair punishment to a party who had the foresight to bring a laptop to the
courtroom, so as to take advantage of the Wi-Fi access.113
The Supreme Court of Kentucky heard a case in 2012 involving two
jurors who were found to be Facebook “friends” with the mother of the
victim.114 When the initial jury panel was asked during voir dire whether
106. Id. Later, the trial judge referred to the decision as a “very close call.” Id. at 201.
107. See id. at 201–02 (describing the trial judge’s unique ability to judge the bias of the
prospective juror, and in this case, the judge’s decision to exclude the juror out of an “abundance of
caution”).
108. See id. (limiting the scope of Johnson and Rule 69.025 to Internet searches of litigation
history only).
109. See id. at 202–03 (speculating that a “day may come” in which the Missouri Supreme
Court may need to reconsider the scope of pretrial research of prospective jurors; however, noting
“that day has not arrived as of yet”).
110. See Carino v. Muenzen, No. L-0028-07, 2010 WL 3448071, at *10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Aug. 30, 2010) (per curiam) (finding the trial court judge acted unreasonably by requiring trial
counsel to notify an adversary and the court prior to using the Internet during voir dire, without
citing any basis for such a decision).
111. See id. at *4 (highlighting an exchange between the trial judge and the plaintiff’s counsel
in which the judge required notice before accessing the Internet).
112. See id. at *9 (“In the absence of a statute or court rule to the contrary, as long as the
selection procedure results in a fair and impartial jury, the manner in which a jury is to be selected is
properly within the trial court’s sound discretion.” (quoting State v. Howard, 471 A.2d 796, 799 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983))).
113. See id. at *10 (regarding the use of the Internet to vet potential jurors as fair when both
parties were given equal access to the Internet, “even if only one [party] chose to utilize it”).
114. See Sluss v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 215, 221 (Ky. 2012) (determining whether the
court erred in denying a motion for new trial, where, among other things, jurors were discovered to
have been untruthful during voir dire).
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they knew the victim or the victim’s family, neither of the two jurors
responded.115 One juror denied having a Facebook account at all.116
After an insightful discussion on the nature of online relationships,117 the
Kentucky Supreme Court remanded the case for a hearing to determine
whether the two jurors’ relationship with the victim’s mother was
sufficient to constitute a strike for cause.118
While making this ruling, the Supreme Court of Kentucky also took the
opportunity to review the ethics of the increasingly “commonplace”
practice of Internet vetting of potential jurors.119 Recognizing the
information posted on social media websites as “likely public,” the court
allowed for pretrial searches of prospective jurors’ networking sites by
adopting the guidance of the New York County Lawyers Association’s
Committee of Professional Ethics.120 Following these guidelines, “it is
proper and ethical” for Kentucky lawyers to conduct Internet searches of

115. Id.
116. See id. at 222 (reciting a juror denying having knowledge of the case and “unequivocally”
denying having a Facebook).
117. The Kentucky Supreme Court considered the varying weight of Facebook “friendships,”
rather than the existence of an online relationship, to determine whether a new trial should have been
granted. See id. at 222–23 (acknowledging that, although becoming “friends” on Facebook requires
an affirmative request and/or approval, the term “friend” fails to sufficiently connote the nuance and
variance within those relationships). One person may be stating the truth when denying knowledge
of another person, while also maintaining a relationship as Facebook friends. See id. at 222 (“[A]
person can become ‘friends’ with people to whom the person has no actual connection . . . .”). Thus,
the existence of a Facebook relationship between a juror and family member of a victim, standing
alone, is insufficient to require a new trial. See id. (stating that Facebook relationships do not provide
enough evidence to presume juror bias sufficient to require a new trial).
118. See id. at 229 (directing the trial court to consider the extent of the relationship between
the two dishonest jurors and the mother’s victim when determining whether to grant a new trial). But
see Sluss v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.3d 279, 286–87 (Ky. 2014) (approving, after the hearing on
remand, of the trial court’s decision to deny a motion for new trial).
119. See Sluss, 381 S.W.3d at 227 (recognizing that, while perhaps more commonplace, many
lawyers are still “skittish” given that “court rules on the subject are murky or nonexistent in most
jurisdictions” (quoting Brian Grow, Internet v. Courts: Googling for the Perfect Juror, REUTERS (Feb. 17,
2011, 2:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-courts-voirdire-idUSTRE71G4VW20110217)).
120. See id. at 228 (approving of the New York County Lawyer Association’s guidelines,
considering them similar to Kentucky’s Rules of Professional Conduct). Compare KY. SUP. CT.
R. 3.130 (3.5) (West 2018) (prohibiting communication between a lawyer and juror, and
distinguishing between communication during trial and communication post-trial), with N.Y. Cty.
Lawyers’ Ass’n Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Formal Op. 743, at 1 (May 18, 2011),
http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications1450_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SZZ8NVNE] [hereinafter N.Y. Cty. Formal Op. 743] (adding a distinction regarding pretrial online vetting
and approving of such vetting so long as the juror is not contacted).
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prospective jurors “provided that there is no contact or communication
with the prospective juror,” including through Facebook or Twitter.121
C. Ethics Opinions from Outside of Texas
The State Bar of Texas Committee on Professional Ethics currently has
no formal ethics opinion addressing the use of Internet during voir
dire.122 Additionally, the local bar associations of Texas’s major
metropolitan areas also lack formal opinions on the topic.123 However,
the American Bar Association, as well as several state and local bar
associations from outside of Texas, have published formal ethics opinions
on the precise issue.
The non-Texas ethics opinions provide a clear answer to the question of
using Internet resources to evaluate prospective jurors: yes, it is permitted,
subject to certain qualifications.124 The major qualifications that follow
121. Sluss, 381 S.W.3d at 221 (quoting N.Y. Cty. Formal Op. 743, supra note 120).
122. See generally TEX. COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, supra note 10 (showing no formal ethics
opinions regarding the use of Internet during voir dire at the completion of research for this
Comment). The most relevant authority on lawyer social media use in Texas comes from the Texas
Young Lawyers Association, and even that lacks guidance on research of prospective jurors, jurors,
or other third-parties. See TEX. YOUNG LAWYERS ASS’N, TYLA POCKET GUIDE: SOCIAL MEDIA
101 (2013), https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Lawyers_Home&Template=
/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=25527 [https://perma.cc/RC54-7UA4] (providing basic
guidance on social media use as it relates to the legal profession).
123. Upon review, most local bar associations of Texas do not publish their own formal ethics
opinions on any topic. See generally Local Bar Association Roster, STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Local_Bar_Websites
[https://perma.cc/
VS8E-FFTJ] (showing the shortage of published formal ethics opinions by most local bar
associations in Texas at the time this Comment was written). However, the Dallas Bar Association
has published articles on social media ethics in its monthly publication. See Nicole Knox, Ethics
Column: Three Ethical Rules in a Facebook Nation, DALLAS BAR ASSOCIATION HEADNOTES, May 2015,
at 13 (advising attorneys to follow ABA Formal Op. 466); John G. Browning, Legal Ethics and Social
Media: It’s Complicated, DALLAS BAR ASSOCIATION HEADNOTES, December 2013, at 9 (cautioning
attorneys researching third-parties online to treat social media as normal communication, subject to
traditional ethical rules).
124. See ABA Formal Op. 466, supra note 8, at 1 (“[A] lawyer may review a juror’s or potential
juror’s Internet presence . . . .”); Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Ethics Op. 127, at 1 (2015),
http://www.cobar.org/Portals/COBAR/repository/ethicsOpinions/FormalEthicsOpinion_127.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9K28-PK5T ] [hereinafter Colo. Formal Ethics Op. 127] (“A lawyer may always
view the public portion of a person’s social media profile and any public posts made by a person
through social media.”); D.C. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 371, at 4 (2016), https://www.dcbar.org/barresources/legal-ethics/opinions/Ethics-Opinion-371.cfm#ftnref28 [https://perma.cc/ES38-TYEX]
[hereinafter D.C. Ethics Op. 371] (“Accessing public social media sites of jurors or potential jurors is
not prohibited by Rule 3.5 as long as there is no communication by the lawyer with the juror in
violation of Rule 3.5(b) . . . .”); N.Y.C. Formal Op. 2012-2, supra note 72, at 7 (“The Committee
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that endorsement are unanimous—the approval applies only to the
information available to the public.125 Lawyers may not request to see
information the juror designates as private, as such requests would
constitute prohibited communications.126 Furthermore, lawyers may not
use deception to circumvent the communication prohibition.127
Therefore, a lawyer cannot create a profile with a fake name
and profile picture to request access to a private account or ask another to
make a request on their behalf.128
Despite the near universal agreement on those major points, there is
one minor point of divergence. Bar association committees disagree on
whether “network-generated notifications” constitute prohibited
communications.129 These notifications are sent automatically to an
account owner when another user views their account, regardless of the

concludes that an attorney may research potential or sitting jurors using social media services or
websites, provided that a communication with the juror does not occur.”); N.Y. Cty. Formal Op. 743,
supra note 120, at 1 (“It is proper and ethical under RPC 3.5 for a lawyer to undertake a pretrial search
of a prospective juror’s social networking site, provided that there is no contact or communication
with the prospective juror . . . .”); Or. Formal Op. 2013-189, supra note 72, at 2 (“Lawyer may access
publicly available information on a social networking website.”); Pa. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2014-300,
at 2 (2014), https://www.pabar.org/members/catalogs/Ethics%20Opinions/formal/F2014-300.pdf
[https://perma.cc/26BF-LNRS] [hereinafter Pa. Formal Op. 2014-300] (“Attorneys may review a
juror’s Internet presence.”); W. Va. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Legal Ethics Op. 2015-02, at 18
(2015), http://www.wvodc.org/pdf/LEO%202015%20-%2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG77-QCZJ]
(“Although attorneys may review the public sections of a juror’s social networking websites,
attorneys are prohibited from attempting to access the private portions of a juror’s social media
page . . . .”).
125. See, e.g., Pa. Formal Op. 2014-300, supra note 124, at 16 (“[A]n attorney may access the
public portion of a juror’s social networking website but may not attempt or request to access the
private portions of the website.”).
126. See, e.g., ABA Formal Op. 466, supra note 8, at 1 (“An access request is a communication
to a juror asking the juror for information that the juror has not made public and that would be the
type of ex parte communication prohibited by Model Rule 3.5(b).”).
127. See, e.g., Colo. Formal Ethics Op. 127, supra note 124, at 4 (“No exception in the Rules
permits a lawyer to employ deception or subterfuge to gain access to restricted information through
social media.”).
128. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Formal Op. 2012-2, supra note 72, at 2 (“In addition, the attorney must
not use deception—such as pretending to be someone else—to gain access to information about a
juror that would otherwise be unavailable.”).
129. Compare ABA Formal Op. 466, supra note 8 (considering network-generated notifications
as non-communication, and therefore acceptable), with N.Y. Cty. Formal Op. 743, supra note 120, at 3
(fearing that even inadvertent notice might influence a juror’s decision-making), and N.Y.C. Formal
Op. 2012-2, supra note 72, at 5–6 (analyzing the definition of “communication” and determining
inadvertent notifications may be prohibited communication).
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viewer’s intentions.130 LinkedIn is a common example.131 Additionally,
the relatively new Instagram “stories” feature likely qualifies.132 The
American Bar Association’s Formal Opinion 466 stands for the majority
view, which does not consider such notifications to be a communication
by the lawyer to the juror.133 In their view, the lawyer is not
communicating in those circumstances—rather, the social media network
is communicating.134 Consequently, following the ABA’s opinion, a
lawyer may view a juror’s public LinkedIn account without fear of ethical
violations.135
The New York City Bar Association and New York County Bar
Association, together, constitute the minority view.136 The New York
County Bar Association’s opinion held that network-generated
notifications, though sometimes inadvertent, may influence a juror’s
decision-making.137 One year later, the New York City Bar Association
130. See ABA Formal Op. 466, supra note 8, at 4–5 (“[T]he key feature . . . is that the jurorsubscriber is able to determine not only that his ESM is being viewed, but also the identity of the
viewer.”).
131. See Who’s Viewed Your Profile - Privacy Settings, LINKEDIN (Mar. 2016), https://www.
linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/47992 [https://perma.cc/3CQZ-QPBQ] (informing users that
they will see the name, location, industry, and other information of accounts who visit their profile,
unless the viewing user has a Premium account).
132. See How Can I Tell Who’s Seen My Instagram Story?, INSTAGRAM,
https://help.instagram.com/202055156863605 [https://perma.cc/6BKU-MPCY] (instructing users
that they will be able to see the names of people who view their “stories”).
133. See ABA Formal Op. 466, supra note 8, at 5 (“This Committee concludes that a lawyer
who uses a shared ESM platform to passively view juror ESM under these circumstances does not
communicate with the juror.”). This interpretation is also followed by the bar associations of
Colorado, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania. See Colo. Formal Ethics Op. 127, supra note 124, at 3
(“[T]he social media service is communicating with the juror based on a technical feature of the
particular social media, consistent with agreements between the provider and the subscriber.”); D.C.
Ethics Op. 371, supra note 124, at 4 (“In the Committee’s view, such [automatically-provided]
notification does not constitute a communication between the lawyer and the juror or prospective
juror.”); Pa. Formal Op. 2014-300, supra note 124, at 16 (“There is no ex parte communication if the
social networking website independently notifies users when the page has been viewed.”). Oregon
and West Virginia, whose state bar associations address using the Internet to evaluate prospective
jurors, are silent to this narrow issue.
134. See ABA Formal Op. 466, supra note 8, at 5 (“The lawyer is not communicating with the
juror; the ESM service is communicating with the juror based on a technical feature of the ESM.”).
135. See id. (implying that, as network-generated notification from passive lawyer review is not
communication, it is permissible to review LinkedIn accounts, so long as other ethical rules are not
violated in the process).
136. N.Y. Cty. Formal Op. 743, supra note 120; N.Y.C. Formal Op. 2012-2, supra note 72.
137. See N.Y. Cty. Formal Op. 743, supra note 120, at 3 (“If a juror becomes aware of an
attorney’s efforts to see the juror’s profiles on websites, the contact may well consist of an
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crafted a similar opinion, but added depth with an analysis of Black’s Law
Dictionary’s definition of “communication.”138 Their analysis concluded
that communication contains no mens rea element.139 Therefore,
communication occurs when knowledge or information is received,
regardless of the intention of the one communicating, and notifications
impart knowledge of being searched.140 However, the New York City Bar
Association could only say it was surely prohibited where the lawyer was
aware that such review would result in the juror being notified—
inadvertent
notifications
“might
constitute
a
prohibited
communication[.]”141
Several other state and local bar associations have crafted ethics
opinions on lawyer review of third party Internet profiles, while not
necessarily distilling the differences between jurors, witnesses, or other
natural parties.142 Still, the primary ideas of those opinions remain largely
consistent with the opinions already mentioned: public portions of online

impermissible communication, as it might tend to influence the juror’s conduct with respect to the
trial.”).
138. See N.Y.C. Formal Op. 2012-2, supra note 72, at 6 (highlighting that Black’s Law
Dictionary definition of “communication” focuses on the effect on the receiver of information).
139. See id. at 5 (“The Rule does not contain a mens rea requirement; by its literal terms, it
prohibits all communication, even if inadvertent.”).
140. See id. at 6 (“A request or notification transmitted through a social media service may
constitute a communication even if it is technically generated by the service rather than the
attorney . . . .”).
141. See id. at 2 (“We further conclude that the same attempts to research the juror might
constitute a prohibited communication even if inadvertent or unintended.”).
142. Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. KBA E-434 (2012), http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.kybar.
org/resource/resmgr/Ethics_Opinions_(Part_2)_/kba_e-434.pdf [https://perma.cc/HTZ8-NF7G]
[hereinafter Ky. Ethics Op. KBA E-434]; N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. #2012-13/05
(2013), https://www.nhbar.org/legal-links/Ethics-Opinion-2012-13_05.asp#6 [https://perma.cc/
4CPJ-BZGB] [hereinafter N.H. Advisory Op. #2012-13/05]; N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics, Ethics Op. 843 (2010), http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=5162
(2014),
[https://perma.cc/NU2A-5GH4];
Mass.
Bar
Ass’n,
Ethics
Op. 2014-5
http://www.massbar.org/publications/ethics-opinions/2010-2019/2014/opinion-2014-5 [https://
perma.cc/E67N-FFE2]; Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-02 (2009),
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/
CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/MDC8-X7T4]; see also San Diego Cty. Bar
Ass’n
Legal
Ethics
Comm.,
SDCBA
Legal
Ethics
Op. 2011-2
(2011),
https://www.sdcba.org/?pg=LEC2011-2 [https://perma.cc/NS66-7SSF] (presenting a model
approach that allows for passive review of jurors’ social media but prohibits contact).
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profiles are always reviewable,143 but an attorney may never use deception
to obtain access to a third party’s private information.144
IV. RECOGNIZING AND RESPONDING TO CONCERNS
Oracle v. Google stands out as being the only judicial opinion to directly,
and aggressively, oppose the practice of investigating prospective jurors’
Internet presence.145 However, Judge Alsup is not the only commentator
to fear the potential negative implications that could come with increased
attorney access to juror Internet profiles during voir dire.146 While
virtually all the professors and practitioners who have written on the
subject approve of the practice—even if begrudgingly so—their approval
did not blind them to the potential problems involved.147 However, most
of their reservations can be soothed with a well-crafted rule.
A. Emboldening Jurors to Research
Commentators fear that increased freedom for lawyers to use the
Internet to research jurors will embolden jurors to do the same to lawyers,
parties, or witnesses.148 However, for this fear to ever become reality, the
143. See, e.g., Ky. Ethics Op. KBA E-434, supra note 142, at 2 (“If the site is ‘public,’ and
accessible to all, then there does not appear to be any ethical issue.”).
144. See, e.g., N.H. Advisory Op. #2012-13/05, supra note 142 (“Deceit is improper, whether it
is accomplished by providing information or by deliberately withholding it.”).
145. See generally Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
(dreading the idea that trial lawyers may dissect a juror’s personal information through online
investigations).
146. See, e.g., Caren Myers Morrison, Investigating Jurors on Social Media, 35 PACE L. REV. 285,
285–91 (2014) (criticizing the practice of researching jurors’ Internet presence and imploring courts
to, at minimum, give jurors advance notice of the impending searches).
147. See Michael Begovich, Voir Dire in a Digital World: A Model for Ethical Internet Investigation of
the Venire, 36 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 227, 249 (2014) (presenting “conservative” guidelines for ethical
investigation of the venire through the Internet); Browning, Ethical Concerns, supra note 5, at 49
(recognizing Internet research as a threat to juror privacy but contending the Internet to be a valuable
tool to research jurors); Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Investigating Jurors in the Digital Age: One Click at a Time,
60 U. KAN. L. REV. 611, 647–48 (2011) (proposing discovery-like rules to be applied to Internet
research of jurors to “help curb some of the criticism aimed at the investigation of jurors”);
Robinson, supra note 5, at 618–38 (identifying several concerns but ultimately suggesting it is now
“impossible to stop attorneys from using resources available online to investigate and monitor
jurors”).
148. See Oracle, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1102 (suggesting that once a juror becomes aware of
attorney investigation into their social media there exists a very significant risk of unfairness in the
trial); see also Morrison, supra note 146, at 303 (warning that lawyers looking for misconduct “may
want to consider what kind of behavior they are modeling” or else “jurors may feel entitled to do a
bit of research of their own”).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

25

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 3, Art. 4

690

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:665

jurors would first need to learn of attorneys conducting research of their
Internet profiles. The jurors could receive notice in two ways. First,
jurors could learn from the court itself. Articles, opinions, and judges have
suggested giving jurors advance notice of impending online research as a
matter of fairness and respect for the juror.149 But any such advance
notification may actually produce, rather than pacify, any anxiety that
would cause a juror to conduct his or her own research. A prospective
juror’s decision to privatize portions of a social media account implies
awareness that unknown people may review the portions left public for
unknown reasons.150 In other words, prospective jurors who have left
their social media accounts public should already know strangers will look
at those accounts; they just don’t know who the stranger is, or why that
stranger is looking. Here, where the stranger is a lawyer researching the
prospective juror’s social media to discover any potential bias, ignorance
may be bliss. Advance notice would aggravate anxieties the prospective
juror has already chosen to dismiss.
Second, a juror could also learn of impending or occurring research
through either a request for increased access or through a networkgenerated notification. However, each bar association opinion on the
issue specifically rejects the notion that attorneys can send any requests to
gain access to a juror’s private information.151 Network-generated
notifications may inadvertently provide a juror notice of lawyer review,
especially in jurisdictions that do not consider network-generated
notifications to be prohibited communication.152 But, a rule that
considers such notifications prohibited communication further decreases
149. See Oracle, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1103–04 (mandating that both parties “inform the venire of
the specific extent to which it . . . will use Internet searches to investigate and to monitor jurors”); see
also ABA Formal Op. 466, supra note 8, at 3 (2014) (“[J]udges should consider advising jurors during
the orientation process that their backgrounds will be of interest . . . .”); Morrison, supra note 146,
at 301–02 (suggesting trial judges should be able to inform jurors their social media profiles will be
searched); Robinson, supra note 5, at 628 (suggesting pre-investigation notice as a way to preserve
juror privacy).
150. See Can I Tell Who’s Looking at My Profile?, FACEBOOK, https://www.
facebook.com/help/210896588933875 [https://perma.cc/8SYX-AW5E] (explaining that Facebook
does not allow users to track who has viewed their profile).
151. See, e.g., Or. Formal Op. 2013-189, supra note 72 (permitting review of public information
about third parties by glancing through their social networking websites).
152. Compare N.Y.C. Formal Op. 2012-2, supra note 72, at 5–6 (prohibiting attorneys from
reviewing profiles on social networks known to notify users upon review, such as LinkedIn), with
ABA Formal Op. 466, supra note 8 (holding network-generated notifications to not be barred
communication).
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the chance of jurors becoming aware of a review of their online profile.
Additionally, regardless what the attorneys do, jurors in Texas are still
instructed not to use electronics or social media, and further, not to
conduct their own research.153
B. Selecting a Biased Jury
Judges and commentators are also afraid that increased Internet access
to research jurors, rather than being used to fetter out biases, would be
used to discover traits of bias favorable to a particular argument.154 For
example, prosecutors may seek jurors who are sympathetic to police
officers, while defense attorneys may want jurors with negative past
experiences with police. However, jury selection has never been one of
selecting favorable jurors—it is a process of striking jurors who might be
unfavorable.155 An attorney cannot choose a favorable juror, they can
only hope that juror is not struck.156 It is the job of opposing counsel to
recognize the potential bias in a prospective juror and strike that juror or
challenge for cause.157 The net result of both parties recognizing and
striking potentially prejudicial jurors hopefully results in an impartial
panel.158
C. Personal Appeals
Judges and writers also worry that attorneys might exploit information
gathered from Internet investigations to make personal appeals to the

153. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 226a (instructing, among other things, that jurors turn off their
electronic devices, refrain from using social media, not communicate with anyone, or conduct their
own research); see also Amy J. St. Eve et al., More from the #Jury Box: The Latest on Juries and Social Media,
12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 64, 86 (2014) (considering carefully-crafted instructions prohibiting juror
use of social media “the best way to ensure an impartial jury [panel] in the age of social media”).
154. See Morrison, supra note 146, at 288 (vying that most Internet searches are simply ways
attorneys increase their jury appeal); Robinson, supra note 5, at 630–31 (examining the issues created
when attorneys select biased jurors).
155. See In re Commitment of Hill, 334 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (finding
attorneys have a right to question potential jurors to discover biases and strike the jurors
accordingly); Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 710–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (providing the
reasoning behind the voir dire requirement).
156. See Hoffmeister, supra note 147, at 614 n.23 (proposing that jury selection be re-named
“jury de-selection” as “neither party has an affirmative right to empanel certain jurors”).
157. Supra Part IIB.
158. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 630 (“In the end, however, the net result of this use of
research on jurors to select a biased jury may be the creation of a balanced panel.”).
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jury.159 For example, by reviewing a prospective juror’s Facebook profile,
an attorney may learn that juror’s favorite book is To Kill a Mockingbird.160
Such knowledge might prove particularly useful for a defense attorney,
who could analogize the situation of the defendant to that of Tom
Robinson.161 If attorneys are given the ability to research prospective
jurors, there may not be a satisfactory scheme to ensure that personal
appeals are not made based on the information collected on that review.
However, such a preventative scheme might not be necessary, as the
judicial and academic fear over attorneys’ utilization of juror information
during trial is likely overstated. Simply, for many attorneys, such efforts
would be a waste of time.162 While discovering and removing biases is an
issue of constitutional concern and attention, time and resources spent
mining for a perfect quote to use during closing arguments could be better
spent strengthening a case elsewhere. The use of personal appeals gleaned
from review of online public information is a strategic decision best left
with attorneys.
D. Infringing Juror Privacy
All these listed concerns relate back to an overriding desire to protect
the privacy of the prospective jurors. Judge Alsup correctly asserted that
jurors are not tools to be manipulated by attorneys; rather, they are citizens
performing a sacrosanct civic duty, sacrificing time and peace of mind.163

159. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1102–03 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
(fearing that attorneys might begin using a prospective juror’s favorite quote during trial); Morrison,
supra note 146, at 299 (viewing attorney’s exploitation of juror’s personal information “distasteful”).
But see Hoffmeister, supra note 147, at 633 (finding “well-placed metaphors” as methods by which
attorneys may “bond with jurors”).
160. See Oracle, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1103 (mentioning To Kill A Mockingbird as an example of
how an attorney might exploit juror information); Morrison, supra note 146, at 288–90 (viewing an
attorney’s investigation of a juror’s social media as unfair and exploitative).
161. Tom Robinson is a character in the novel who is falsely accused of rape. See generally
HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960) (articulating the racial injustice which leads a man
to be convicted of a crime he obviously did not commit).
162. See Morrison, supra note 146, at 302 (“[An] investigated jury, vetted by leading trial
consultants[,] . . . is not likely to perform substantially differently from a jury picked at random.”).
163. See Oracle, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1103 (“The jury is not a fantasy team composed by
consultants, but good citizens commuting from all over our district, willing to serve our country, and
willing to bear the burden of deciding a commercial dispute the parties themselves cannot resolve.”);
Morrison, supra note 146, at 289–91 (warning a lack of transparency regarding the use of online
investigation in the jury selection process may negatively impact citizens’ willingness to partake in
jury duty when they discover “that jury duty entails . . . wholesale intrusion into their online lives”).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss3/4

28

Harle: Pre-Trial Internet Investigation of Prospective Jurors

2018]

COMMENT

693

Increasing attorney access to the private lives of jurors may have a chilling
effect on jurors’ willingness to participate.164
However, while valuing a prospective juror’s privacy interest, the
Supreme Court of the United States has not granted prospective jurors a
privacy right.165 Given this difference, commentators considered the
constitutional rights to an impartial jury at trial to override the prospective
jurors’ privacy interest.166 Existing ethics opinions protect that privacy
interest; under those opinions, attorneys are only entitled to review what is
made available to the public by the juror.167 Thus, ethics opinions seek to
protect the privacy of prospective jurors as much as jurors themselves
protect it.168
Furthermore, a lawyer’s online investigations of prospective jurors may
actually enhance juror privacy rather than erode it.169 In typical voir dire
164. See United States v. Norwood, No. 12-CR-20287, 2014 WL 1796644, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
May 6, 2014) (fearing the attorneys’ attempts to monitor the juror’s social media use “would
‘unnecessarily chill the willingness of jurors . . . to serve as participants in our democratic system of
justice’” (quoting United States v. Kilpatrick, No. 10-20403, 2012 WL 3237147 at *3 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 7, 2012))); United States v. Blagojevich, 614 F.3d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(“Most people dread jury duty—partly because of privacy concerns.”).
165. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 514–15 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (“Certainly, a juror has a valid interest in not being required to disclose to all the world
highly personal or embarrassing information simply because he is called to do his public duty. . . . I
am concerned that recognition of a juror’s privacy ‘right’ would unnecessarily complicate the lives of
trial judges attempting to conduct a voir dire proceeding.”).
166. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 624 (concluding the Supreme Court of the United States
“has refused to give prospective jurors a similar reassurance regarding a constitutional right either to
refuse to answer questions or to avoid public disclosure of their answers” (quoting Karen Monsen,
Privacy for Prospective Jurors at What Price? Distinguishing Privacy Rights from Privacy Interests; Rethinking
Procedures to Protect Privacy in Civil and Criminal Cases, 21 REV. LITIG. 285, 288–89 (2002))).
167. See, e.g., ABA Formal Op. 466, supra note 8 (permitting passive review of jurors’ public
online presence while forbidding attorney attempts to access private portions of a juror’s social
media). The Supreme Court of the United States has also held that information exposed to the
public to view carries “no reasonable expectation of privacy[.]” See California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (asserting “police cannot be reasonably expected to avert their eyes from”
information left out to be viewed by the public).
168. Additionally, Internet-using jurors may have lower privacy expectations regarding what
they post online.
See Hoffmeister, supra note 147, at 638 (“Courts have consistently
recognized . . . [Internet users] have a lower expectation of privacy in information that they
themselves make available on the Internet.”); see also Robinson, supra note 5, at 628 (“The active,
voluntarily sharing of information in social media may reflect different conceptions of privacy among
users of these websites and services.”). This is particularly true for younger generations who grew up
with the Internet. See Hoffmeister, supra note 147, at 637 (discussing differences in privacy
expectations between “Digital Natives” and “Digital Immigrants”).
169. See Morrison, supra note 146, at 293 (“[O]nline jury investigation might arguably be less
offensive to jurors because it avoids putting them on the spot.”).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

29

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 3, Art. 4

694

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:665

scenarios, prospective jurors may be required to divulge private
information, out loud, in front of several dozen strangers.170 An attorney,
by reviewing an online social media profile, may be able to obtain the
desired information before the question is asked.171 Online investigations
may also be less intrusive than former “traditional” investigations, in which
attorneys would hire private investigators to survey homes of jurors.172
V. UPDATING TEXAS VOIR DIRE
The primary goal of voir dire in Texas is to seat an impartial jury.173
Texas’s current structure for achieving that goal is flexible, lacking clear
guidelines, and designed to maximize attorneys’ abilities to fetter out
biased or prejudiced jurors.174 Updating the current voir dire structure to
include pretrial Internet searches of the venire furthers this goal. Allowing
attorneys to conduct online investigations of prospective jurors increases
the likelihood that an attorney will discover relationships, predispositions,
or untruthful responses sufficient to constitute grounds for a challenge for
cause, or other information that may facilitate intelligent use of a
peremptory strike.175 An overwhelming weight of authority permits, and

170. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 226 (requiring prospective jurors to swear to answer all questions
truthfully).
171. See Morrison, supra note 146, at 293 (articulating the value of online investigating in
enabling attorneys to uncover relevant juror information while saving jurors the offense or
discomfort of disclosing the information in open court).
172. See Hoffmeister, supra note 147, at 638 (considering online investigations better than the
alternative of intrusive, “traditional” investigations); see also Morrison, supra note 146, at 291–92
(describing the evolution of juror investigation from “the grizzled gumshoe in a cheap raincoat
driving slowly past prospective jurors’ houses to nattily attired paralegals sitting in the back of
courtrooms frantically surfing social media sites”).
173. See In re Commitment of Hill, 334 S.W.3d 226, 228 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (reversing
the lower courts’ decision to stop a party from utilizing acceptable modes of juror questioning,
thereby depriving the party of the ability to select an unbiased jury).
174. See Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743, 750 (Tex. 2006) (identifying the
boundary of peremptory challenges in permitting “parties to reject jurors they perceive to be
unsympathetic to their position” but not “to ‘select’ a favorable jury”); see also 4 MCDONALD &
CARLSON, supra note 41, § 21:19 (“[T]he scope of the voir dire examination . . . [cannot] be bounded
by inflexible rules of thumb, for of all the delicate psychological factors inherent in a jury trial
perhaps none is more essentially subjective and hence less submissive to dogmatic limitations.”).
175. See Hill, 334 S.W.3d at 228 (“Litigants have the right to question potential jurors to
discover biases and to properly use peremptory challenges.” (citing Hyundai, 189 S.W.3d at 749–50));
Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 710–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (summarizing the role of voir dire
in revealing information that would establish juror bias sufficient to raise a challenge for cause and in
advancing the right to assert peremptory challenges).
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occasionally encourages, such searches, presenting Texas with a clear
picture of how to fashion its own rules.176
Should Texas choose to formally permit online pretrial investigations of
prospective jurors, the following provisions should be included,
considering both Texas law, the judicial and bar association formal
opinions, and academic commentary:
First, any online investigation of prospective jurors must be limited to
only what is made available to the public by the prospective juror. Every
bar association to share its opinion has strictly forbidden “friend” requests
of any kind, and Texas should follow suit.177 The weight of authority
from other states suggests such affirmative conduct constitutes a
prohibited communication barred by Rule 3.06(b) of the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.178 Furthermore, citizens
need not volunteer all private aspects of their lives upon being called to
potentially serve as a juror. However, what they choose to leave available
to the public should be available for the public, including attorneys, to
review.179
Second, Internet investigations resulting in network-generated
notifications should be barred. As explained by the New York City Bar
Association, such notifications constitute impermissible communications
between the reviewing attorney and the prospective juror.180 According
to that opinion, a communication occurs when the juror receives

176. See Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 558–59 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam)
(hinting at an affirmative duty for attorneys to use the Internet to gather information regarding
jurors’ prior litigation history); see also, e.g., D.C. Ethics Op. 371, supra note 124, at 4 (presenting, to
this point, the most recently crafted opinion on pretrial Internet investigations of prospective jurors).
177. See Pa. Formal Op. 2014-300, supra note 124, at 16 (excluding the private components of
a juror’s social media website from the purview of what an attorney may access in investigating jurors
online).
178. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.06(b) (prohibiting contact or
communication with members of the venire).
179. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (reiterating the absence of Fourth
Amendment protection for information voluntarily made accessible for the public’s review (citing
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967))).
180. See N.Y.C. Formal Op. 2012-2, supra note 72, at 5–6 (focusing the analysis of whether a
“communication” has occurred “on the effect on the receiver,” which may lend to a finding that an
inadvertent, automated message constitutes a prohibited “communication”).
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information that a litigating attorney reviewed their profile,181 and such
information has the potential to influence a juror’s decision-making.182
Furthermore, LinkedIn, the social media website most often associated
with these “network-generated” notifications, is the most popular social
media website for lawyers.183 New rules should be written with an
expectation of Internet competence, and in fact, the American Bar
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct require such.184
Lawyers must now “keep abreast of . . . the benefits and risks associated
with relevant technology.”185 Banning investigation that results in
network-generated notifications may slightly restrict voir dire; however,
such a ban prevents improper communications and encourages attorney
Internet literacy.
Third, judges must not notify prospective jurors of the impending or
ongoing Internet investigations;186 however, judges should give general
notice that the attorneys may investigate the jurors’ backgrounds.
Currently, Rule 226a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires judges
to inform jurors that attorneys “have the right to ask you questions about
your background, experiences, and attitudes.”187 Simply changing the
language to instead say that attorneys “have the right to investigate jurors’
backgrounds” would be sufficient to notify the jurors of the impending
Internet investigations.
Specifically notifying the venire of potential Internet investigations may
cause more problems than it prevents. While jurors may have a moment
to update their privacy settings, such notice may cause an unnecessary
anxiety amongst the jurors, or it may even embolden jurors to conduct
181. See id. at 6 (explaining how any transmission of information constitutes communication,
regardless of whether the transmission was intentional).
182. See N.Y. Cty. Formal Op. 743, supra note 120, at 3 (stating that jurors’ conduct may be
influenced if they discover attorneys reviewed their social media accounts).
183. See The Editors, Survey Results: Truths About Lawyers and Social Media, ATTORNEY AT
WORK, (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.attorneyatwork.com/survey-results-truths-lawyer-social-media/
[https://perma.cc/79HL-S6RG] (reporting LinkedIn as the most widely used social website by
lawyers, followed by Facebook and Twitter).
184. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (requiring
technological competence as part of lawyers’ overall duty “[t]o maintain the requisite knowledge and
skill”).
185. Id.
186. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1103–04 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
(compelling parties to inform the venire of the extent to which they plan to use the Internet to
investigate and monitor jurors).
187. TEX. R. CIV. P. 226a.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss3/4

32

Harle: Pre-Trial Internet Investigation of Prospective Jurors

2018]

COMMENT

697

research of their own.188 However, if jurors were not given such
notification, the jurors would be blissfully unaware of an attorney’s review
of the same public information made available by the jurors to the rest of
the world.189
Fourth, the time in which the online investigations were to be
conducted must not needlessly extend the time the prospective jurors are
required to be present at the courthouse. Currently, trial judges have
broad discretion to control voir dire, including the time spent on voir
dire.190 Out of respect for the juror, judges should not afford attorneys
additional time to conduct Internet investigations. Any such investigation
must take place either concurrently with oral voir dire examination or in
the days prior to voir dire, if the jury list is available in advance.191
These four suggestions foster an appropriate respect for the jurors’
personal lives while also increasing the ability of the court to empanel an
impartial jury.
VI. CONCLUSION
The trail for Texas to follow has been blazed. Existing Texas law,
together with decisions from other state courts, as well as formal ethics
opinions from several bar associations, have worn ruts that can guide
Texas to an ethical and practical solution for voir dire in the twenty-first
century. Jurors are sacrificial citizens who perform a crucial role in the
188. See Oracle, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1102 (contending the “one-sidedness” of lawyers’ Internet
research “will be hard [for jurors] to accept”); see also Morrison, supra note 146, at 303 (warning the
lawyers looking for misconduct “to consider what kind of behavior they are modeling” or else
“jurors may feel entitled to do a bit of research of their own”).
189. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–40 (1988) (rejecting the defendants’ claim
that police breached the Fourth Amendment by retrieving inculpatory evidence from defendants’
trash bags because, regardless of whether defendants “did not expect that the contents of their
garbage bags would become known to the police[,]” application of objective standards shows
defendants “exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth
Amendment protection”).
190. See Mathis v. State, 576 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(finding a court’s ability to establish reasonable time limits on examination “inherent”); McCoy v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (“Generally
speaking, the scope of voir dire examination is a matter which rests largely in the sound discretion of
the trial court.”).
191. The availability of the juror list is subject to the discretion of the District Clerk.
However, the District Clerk can only make the list available to attorneys after the list has first been
sent to the sheriff to summon the jurors. See Tex. Op. JC-0405, supra note 67 (explaining no right
exists for attorneys to review the juror list in advance, but noting it is customary for the list to be
made available to a requesting attorney on the Friday before the Monday of trial).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

33

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 3, Art. 4

698

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:665

judicial process, and their privacy should be respected. However, an
impartial jury panel is constitutionally required. The Internet, and social
media websites in particular, provide additional tools to discover damning
biases, in the occasional instance a juror chooses to not reveal it on their
own. Texas attorneys know this, and many are likely using the Internet to
research jurors without any specific guidance on what is and isn’t
appropriate. To sharpen the ethical boundaries of online Internet
investigations, and further ensure impartial jury panels, Texas needs to
update its voir dire structure to formally permit pretrial Internet
investigations of public information.
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